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Introduction: 
There is overwhelming evidence that indigenous communities in Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia face a disproportionate amount of environmental degradation from extractive industries 
compared to their counterparts that identify as mestizo or white. Environmental protection and 
territorial autonomy are fundamental tenants of most indigenous political organization in rural 
regions with an acute environmental impact from extractive practices. Indigeneity is linked 
intrinsically to territory, but environmental degradation in indigenous territories is more than just 
a land issue. Pollution from extractive industries is extremely detrimental to the public health of 
indigenous communities across the Andes. High rates of environmental degradation on 
indigenous land is surprising given the fact that a substantial portion of the population identifies 
as indigenous and because of the growing environmental consciousness across international 
communities since the 1970s. Intuitively, one would expect that indigenous people would have 
more political power in the national political arena purely because they make up a large portion 
of the electorate. This intuition proves to be false for a variety of historical legacies that have 
undermined and repressed indigenous groups.  
Air and water degradation from resource extraction is extremely consequential for local 
communities. The negative effects of concentrated extraction, however, are less apparent and 
less urgent for policy makers in the international community. Indigenous environmentalism must 
be distinguished from a global environmentalism because transboundary pollution such as 
deforestation and climate change have different set of problems from concentrated pollution 
from resource extraction. The distinction between local and global environmentalism is salient 
because the power dynamic between the two scenarios are so different. The political forces 
involved in local resource extraction are asymmetrical compared global environmental 
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movements. Global environmental movements benefit from and rely on international pressures to 
move policy whereas localized environmental movements have to work within their respective 
national framework. Although international politics is intertwined in the cases discussed in this 
thesis, the domestic political structure and quality of institutions take precedence over 
international actors.  
The goal of this thesis is to analyze why have indigenous environmental movements in 
countries with such a high population of indigenous people continued to fail? It looks at how 
indigenous social movements in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, became part of the formal political 
institutions given varying antecedent conditions such as mobilization of on the basis of ethnicity 
and the desire for organizations to institutionalize. It traces how those movements tried to create 
and enforce environmental policy, and why there is still no long term environmental policy 
protecting indigenous peoples in these countries. It utilizes case studies from each of these three 
countries and a multilevel theory of political analysis to determine the forces responsible for 
fluctuations in environmental outcomes. This thesis argues that government dependence on 
certain extractive industries creates a serious barrier for indigenous political movements who 
seek alliances with the left leaning parties. By tracing the roots of indigenous political 
organization from social movement to political parties, this thesis then evaluates the impact the 
newfound political institutions have had on the three chosen cases of environmental degradation. 
The cases of La Oroya in Peru, the Oriente region in Ecuador, and the case of TIPNIS road 
project in Bolivia demonstrate the importance and limitations of political mobilization based on 
indigenous identity.  
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Literature Review: 
The literature on social movement categorization, formation, and effectiveness spans a 
wide variety of disciplines. In order to situate these specific social movements within the 
literature, it is first important to understand where social movement literature began and where it 
is now. This paper seeks to understand why some movements effectively mobilize popular 
discontent that results in effective environmental policy and social movement efficacy changes 
after they come to participate in formal political institutions. Any conversation on the successes 
and failures of movements cannot exclude the underlying political structures under which a 
given movement operates and, in some cases, joins. The goal of this literature review is to 
contextualize general social movement research and apply it to indigenous environmental 
movements in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Social movement literature begins by categorizing movements in fairly general terms. 
Social movements are categorized by the nature and extent to which they desire change. There 
are reform movements, revolutionary movements, reactionary movements, self-help movements, 
and religious movements. Each style of movement seeks political change by mobilizing 
widespread discontent due to both absolute and relative deprivation, most often within some kind 
of group identity. Reform movements work within the current political framework of a given 
system of governance in order to improve conditions. The cases in this project fall within the 
categorization of reform movements. Reform movements sit in stark contrast to revolutionary 
movements which have the much more ambitious goal of usurping an entire government in order 
to meet their objectives. Reactionary movements respond to recent political change in hopes that 
the recent change will be overturned. Next, religious movements are organized based around an 
underlying religious belief or worldview. Religious movement theory may be utilized in this 
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paper because of the potential overlap between religious and ethnic identities of indigenous 
groups that help facilitate political activity, but will ultimately take a subsidiary role. 
         Social movement theory also spends a great deal of time on why some cases of 
widespread discontent result in political activism while other cases do not. James C. Davies and 
Ted Robert Gurr (1970) posit that one group’s relative deprivation of some need is more 
important to the formation of social movements than absolute deprivation. That is to say that 
social discontent only materializes in action when there is a noticeable difference in the standings 
between distinct groups. Relative deprivation can apply to material, political, social inequities. 
Snow and Oliver (1995) later contended that relative deprivation is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the formation of social movements. Relative deprivation must be present but it does 
not tell the full story. 
         Again, most of the research contributing to social movement theory focuses on the 
formation of social movements to begin with and then traces their successes and failures to the 
inherent characteristics of the movements themselves. One avenue that social movement scholars 
have pointed to as being a central condition of social movement success is the way that social 
movements create social networks and recruit members. David S. Meyer observed “[T]he best 
predictor of why anyone takes on any political action is whether that person has been asked to do 
so. Issues do not automatically drive people into the streets,” (Meyer, 2007). This idea is useful 
when analyzing the social infrastructure that movements rely on. Although demographic and 
communication capabilities might be similar, the way those resources are utilized can account for 
large discrepancies in a movement’s effectiveness. 
Another idea put forth by McCarthy and Zald (1977) is Resource Mobilization Theory.  
This theory argues that social movements are a rational response by social movement leaders. 
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Under this theory, the most salient factor for social movements to meet their political goals is the 
way that social movement leaders mobilize resources such as time, money, and energy of the 
population. Critics have argued that Resource Mobilization Theory overestimates the importance 
of leadership and underestimates how powerful emotions are in social movements. Movements 
can be portrayed in this frameworks as cold and unemotional when in reality nearly every social 
movement relies on emotions substantially. Participants of social movements are also known to 
react in substantive ways when conditions worsen. Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca 
Polletta, in their book Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (2004), argue that 
social movements are most effective when leaders maintain a level of emotional energy but make 
decisions in a purely rational way. Resource Mobilization Theory is one of the more prominent 
theories in the field and explains important aspects of social movement’s consequentiality, but 
does not consider the political circumstances, demographic characteristics, economic conditions, 
or historical grievances that explain certain outcome.  
        In contrast, Political Opportunity Theory posits that social movements are more likely to 
arise and succeed when political opportunities emerge. One such opportunity is when a 
previously repressive regime transitions to democracy (Snow and Soule, 2010). This theory is 
supported by the fact that social movements are much more common in democracies or when 
quality of democracy improves. It is useful to frame this research project in Political Opportunity 
Theory because one such measure of the quality of democracy is pluralism within a political 
regime. Pluralism is a state or society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or 
social groups maintain and develop their traditional culture in the framework of a democracy. 
The improvement of the quality of democracy through pluralism can be achieve through rules 
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regarding party formation, redistricting or an improvement in descriptive representation among 
government officials. 
         Raúl Mardrid and Matthew Rodes-Purdy (2016) compared descriptive representation 
among women and indigenous communities in Latin America to see if and how descriptive 
representation affects regime support. They found that descriptive representation based on 
indigenous self-identification in Latin America boosts regime support among indigenous groups 
whereas descriptive representation among women yield more ambiguous results. Indigenous 
identification is more likely to shape political attitudes like class, education, and region. 
Furthermore, they argue that descriptive representation has been correlated to higher voter 
turnout, institutional legitimacy and external efficacy. This paper will look to see how pluralism 
through varying levels of indigenous institutionalization as a potential improvement for the 
quality of democracy and therefore may result in higher levels of environmental protection for 
localized indigenous communities. It is useful to analyze indigenous institutionalization and 
plurinational governance in relation to Political Opportunity Theory because it can potentially 
explain certain aspects of social movement efficacy.  
        Another important consideration is the role of the infamous “Resource Curse” which 
contends that a country’s ability to develop economically is stunted by an abundance of a natural 
resources (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2017). Although economic theory is tangentially 
related to social movement theory, they are in fact connected by their explanatory mechanism: 
quality of democracy. That is to say, countries with industries that make up a dominant part of a 
government’s revenue are more likely to favor policies that support that industry. Overt 
corruption and government dependence on a single resource can diminish the quality of 
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democracy and prohibit social movement success because the governments are more susceptible 
to corruption with one dominant industry. 
         Another explanation for why certain movements are more successful than others is found 
in the literature describing the life cycles of social movements. All social movements follow a 
cycle in which they emerge, coalesce, bureaucratize and decline. The bureaucratization or 
institutionalization stage is an extremely critical time for meeting the initial demands of social 
movements within a reform movement. A movement could fail to bureaucratize or “they may 
well reduce their effectiveness by turning from disruptive activities that succeed in the 
movement’s earlier stages to more conventional activity by working within the system instead of 
outside it.” (Piven and Cloward, 1966) The movement may well be achieving its goal through 
the bureaucratization stage but also may be sacrificing some essential elements of the original 
movement to be seen as acceptable within the regime in which it operates. After 
bureaucratization, a movement will either decline because it has achieved its goals or because it 
has failed. Lack of money, loss of enthusiasm, factionalism, or the government may co-opt the 
movement by meeting small concessions.  
   The second goal of this literature review is to characterize the nature of transnational 
pressures for environmental accountability and activism Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. These 
transnational pressures range from environmental resolutions designed by international 
institutions or through loan conditionality from international trade agreements. It seeks not to 
give a comprehensive history of international environmental law but rather describe the 
international environmental framework as it is operating from 1990 to the present. 
Environmental degradation is intrinsically connected to market failures. Normally 
described as a negative externality, environmental degradation is a factor that markets do not 
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consider. Partisanship debate is over what people consider the state’s role in correcting for 
market failures. Although the basic framework in which governments correct for externalities is 
straight forward, transboundary pollution from international actors complicates the question of 
who is responsible to the environment. International environmental agreements focus on 
transboundary pollution such as ozone depletion, climate change and marine pollution with 
varying levels of success. The Montreal protocol is the posterchild for international agreements 
which successfully restricted the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which deplete the ozone 
(Park and Allaby, 2013). Other environmental negotiations have gone on for years, such as the 
UN conferences on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and Kyoto. The vast 
majority of international agreements have vague targets or a small number of signatories because 
of the bargaining structure of each circumstance and the collective action required to address 
particular issues (Ioannidis, Papandreou and Sartztakis, 2015). Climate change negotiations 
demonstrate how difficult it is to parse through who is responsible for what damage, and who is 
going to incur the cost of reducing greenhouse emissions.  
Nearly all of these agreements utilize international pressure to address transboundary 
environmental harm. Pollution constrained to the borders of one country but caused by 
transnational industry creates a new set of challenges. Governments are put in a precarious 
position where their political success relies heavily on overall economic improvements that rely 
on major industries. These industries in Latin America tend to be mineral, energy or agricultural 
exports that make up a significant part of the countries’ GDP. One way to reduce costs is to look 
the other way when the environment is degraded. In the context of Latin America, both 
economic inequality as well as environmental degradation have largely been blamed on the 
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physical and political infrastructure created by colonial exploitation. It has now been maintained 
by neoliberal policies introduced by international institutions.  
 This argument is best articulated in Open Veins in Latin America: Five Centuries of the 
Pillage of a Continent by Eduardo Galeano (1971). Galeano argues that the roots of poverty in 
Latin America can be traced to a colonial system designed to extract resources. He describes a 
“contemporary system of plunder” in which modern foreign direct investment has its roots in, 
and resembles colonial exploitation. Many of today’s readers may see champions of Galeano’s 
ideology as misguided ideologues, dedicated to a set of principles that have failed to maintain 
economic growth. These ideologues argue that capitalism is directly responsible for much of the 
inequality and relative deprivation in Latin America. There has been a wave of leadership in 
Latin America that includes Hugo Chavez, Nicholas Maduro and Evo Morales that use this 
argument. They have all had a clear anti-colonial, anti-U.S. message and, in the case of 
Venezuela, has led to economic crisis. Galeano’s argument is not simply a critique of the 
material structures of exploitation but also a nuanced look at the costs and benefits of the 
dominant contemporary economic ideology of open markets and investment. 
This argument remains dominant particularly in the context of international economic 
pressures. Latin American governments are expected to “set their house in order.” Robert 
Timmons and Nikki Demetria (2003) present an ecology of environmental crises, as well as the 
surrounding social and political implications in Latin America. The authors argue that the 
demands of environmentalism and of economic development imposed from outside are 
contradictory. One such example is International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality that 
requires governments to meet their debt obligations by encouraging friendlier policies to 
multilateral corporation without increasing health and safety standards. This also often leads to 
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the exploitation of various natural resources because much of Latin America has a comparative 
advantage in raw materials. Additionally, they argue that the most successful environmental 
movements in Latin America are those that directly affect advanced industrial countries such as 
deforestation. This again reaffirms an unequal power dynamic among governments in which 
international forces only advocate for the environment when it meets their self-interest. In 
addition to covering the first and second green revolution with the introduction of GM crops, and 
issues associated with the amazon, it also discusses how health and environmental issues are 
related. This information demonstrates well a power dynamic between Latin American nations 
and the U.S. 
A comprehensive review of environmental activism is indispensable for this research 
because there are a particular set of political forces both internationally and domestically that 
follow patterns in the environmental realm. Industries that produce transnational pollution that 
contaminates water systems and contributes to global warming are more likely to have the 
international environmental forces advocate for higher environmental standards for indigenous 
communities. 
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Theory and Hypotheses:  
Defining and specifying environmental outcomes in this project proved to be challenging 
due to the ambiguous nature of the political and physical realities of different indigenous groups. 
Although outcomes in this project are impossible to measure quantitatively due to the lack of a 
comprehensive data set and the ambiguous nature of what qualifies as successful policy, the 
outcomes in this project are measured by the creation and enforcement of environmental policy 
as a result of organized indigenous mobilization. The most successful outcomes for indigenous 
mobilization is momentary environmental protection and remediation resulting from indigenous 
movements. Temporary success is the best case scenario in the universe of cases which presents 
mostly negative outcomes. The goal of this project is to analyze indigenous environmental 
movements in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia to make a qualitative analysis to test 5 theoretical 
arguments regarding indigenous social movements.  
(1) The first hypothesis is that mobilization on behalf of indigenous identity is more 
likely to yield positive environmental results. Ethnic and cultural mobilization is based around a 
common identity, with tangible features and clear boundaries of who falls into what socially 
constructed category. Indigeneity is a dichotomous identifier that creates a well-defined in-group 
and out-group. Consistent organization is more likely when there is a well-established group 
identity resulting in a more unified political force that will address issues like environmental 
degradation more effectively. Mobilization based on indigenous identity is distinct form 
indigenous identity itself. It is possible that people identify as indigenous without putting their 
indigenous identity at the center of their political engagement.  
(2) Indigenous social movements become more moderate when they institutionalize. 
Movements are more likely to compromise on some of their initial policy objectives after they 
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become part of a formal political parties with the capacity to make policy decisions. Social 
movements become more moderate once they gain political power in democracies largely as a 
result of the democratic process. Social movement leaders are no longer only concerned with 
obtaining their policy objectives, but are now concerned with maintaining their political power 
through democratic means. Social movement leaders must move away from more of the radical 
aspects of their original policy goals to appeal to a broader constituency.  
(3) Social movements are more effective at blocking policy than they are at creating 
policy. The baseline indicator of social movement power is the number of people who actively 
contribute to social movement activities like protests, boycotts, or marches. These activities are 
more disruptive, difficult to ignore and/or suppress when more supporters participate. It is easier 
to mobilize people who disagree with a policy than those who agree with policy for two main 
reasons. First, it is easier to muster a group of people based on the premise that something they 
already possess and use is threatened. In the framework of this project, an example is when air 
and water resources are put at risk and widespread protests shut down cities. Second, a threat to 
something people already have inspires a more visceral emotional response then imagining a 
policy that would create a new resource.   
(4) Coalition building between indigenous movements and political parties on the left 
creates inherent conflicts of interest. The political preferences of the left have historically taken 
precedence over indigenous groups in Latin America. If a political alliance between the left and 
an indigenous group faces a policy decision in which it must choose between helping the left and 
helping indigenous peoples, it will choose helping the left. This is because constituents on the 
left in urban locales are more able to mobilization in a disruptive manner due to physical 
geography. Also, people are more likely to have strong emotional responses to loosing social 
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welfare protections. The last reason for this hypothesis is that indigenous parties are unified 
along ethnic lines instead of an ideological commonalities with well-defined policy preferences 
at the national level.  
 (5) The diversity of indigenous interests is revealed once indigenous parties gain national 
power. Indigenous identity is not defined by a clearly defined worldview that prefers particular 
policy outcomes. Indigenous people are defined only by their nativity to a particular place and 
their implicit right to that place.1 The maintenance of territorial rights, then, is at the heart of 
indigenous politics. The whole premise of indigeneity loses its unifying quality when territorial 
rights are no longer challenged, and indigenous people must decide what to do with their land.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Maybury-Lewis, D. (2005, Spring). DEFINING INDIGENOUS. Cultural Survival Quarterly, 29, 11. Retrieved 
from http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/197456097?accountid=14244 
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Methodology:  
One can only address the question of how the institutionalization of indigenous 
movements affects environmental outcomes for the selected cases in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia 
through qualitative methods. There are no data that include all of the cases of environmental 
degradation for these three countries, nor is it possible to neatly categorize cases as a success or 
failure. There are aspects of each case that look promising for a time but then revert to the same 
or worse conditions. A qualitative approach is the only way to truly explain the varying levels of 
environmental protection and the various political influences. This project will use process 
tracing to follow the narrative of each case by looking at the actors involved and their actions. 
Process tracing allows for a more comprehensive story explaining how indigenous people 
organized and advocated for environmental and human rights issues. It will gather data from 
newspaper articles, scientific studies measuring the health and safety of the environment, court 
cases, legislation, in depth interviews, secondary source material.  
In all of these cases international pressures are pulling in two directions: they want both 
transboundary protection among governments and the cheapest raw materials possible from each 
country’s main industry. These conflicting desires put tremendous pressure on governments to 
make tradeoffs between overall economic growth and environmental protection for its citizens. 
To further understand how actors apply pressure on domestic and international terms it is useful 
to analyze each case applying Kevin Waltz’s three level taxonomy which includes: international, 
domestic and individual. This project focuses primarily on international and domestic pressure 
but will sometimes rely on individual pressures for decision making for some elites.  
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The data gathered for this qualitative approach is found in newspaper articles, scientific 
studies evaluating changes to the environment, court cases, legislation, in depth interviews, and 
secondary source material.  
Case Selection: 
 The Andean countries of South America present a political environment in which 
indigenous people are still a primary feature of political life. I selected Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia 
as the three countries from which cases of environmental degradation were chosen. There are a 
number of similarities in all three of these countries that make them ideal to study indigenous 
environmental movements. In terms of environmental degradation, population demographics and 
systems of government, these three countries are remarkably similar. These three countries are 
located in the Andes, have high percentage of their population that identifies as indigenous from 
both the Amazon region and mountainous regions, have presidential democracies with a 
concentration of power in the executive branch, and have governments that make a substantial 
amount of money off of rents from extractive resources. Although each country relies on 
different resources, each with their own set of environmental hazards, they all threaten the 
quality of local water sources and aquifers. Additionally, all of the industries have had protest 
movements with varying degrees of organizational support and success. 
         In order to understand how domestic and international pressures affect environmental 
movement outcomes in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, one case study has been selected from each 
country. Each case has varying levels of indigenous institutionalization within their 
governments. The cases are selected in order to show the bargaining power of all the involved 
actors and will account for both internal and external political factors. It will focus on national 
indigenous organizations and how they pursued their policy objective and acquire power. This 
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study will describe three cases in depth to immerse readers into the political climate in each 
country. The cases highlight the trials and tribulations of indigenous organizations in each case. 
Cases are evaluated on environmental cleanup, the creation of high environmental standards, and 
the continued enforcement of environmental policies.  
The cases were selected from all major cases of environmental degradation that attracted a 
high rate of social protest reported in newspapers. The movements in La Oroya, the Oriente 
region of Ecuador, and the Isiboro Secure National Park (TIPNIS) were the three most likely 
cases to reach favorable environmental policy outcomes. This is because each case had high 
levels of international environmental advocacy due to egregious violations of human rights 
through environmental negligence and attracted the highest rates of protests in their respective 
countries. An in depth qualitative analysis of these three cases allows for a closer look at the 
causal mechanisms for the policy outcomes in each case.  
The case of La Oroya, Peru will serve as a case in which positive environmental change was 
obtained when domestic political institutions were strong enough to enforce rules imposed by 
conditional lending from the World Bank decades earlier.  Texaco operations in the Oriente 
region of Ecuador shows how well organized national institutions that work outside of the party 
system can create new environmental policy and shows how institutionalization of a movement 
can fail to address past degradation. The current battle over the construction of a road through 
TIPNIS in Bolivia demonstrates how indigenous groups can obtain environmental policy when 
they institutionalize, but also exposes inevitable policy debate between indigenous groups and 
the left leaning parties they associate with. In a number of ways each of these cases are similar to 
one another because their operations have been under either state or multinational ownership 
over time, but each gives a unique insight into how indigenous environmental policy gets 
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sidelined. The wider applicability of these cases is best understood through an analysis of the 
mechanisms that cause certain policy outcomes. That is not to say that these cases do not have 
competing explanatory features, but rather the mechanisms at play in each of these cases 
provided a logical series of cause and effect.  
           First, it is important to understand the varying degrees to which indigenous social 
movements have consolidated and the degree to which they have institutionalized into political 
parties; more specifically into ruling coalitions in the executive branch. Since Evo Morales 
became the president in 2006, Bolivia has the most integrated indigenous movement within its 
executive branch. The Morales government relies on what Raúl Madrid calls Ethno-populism: an 
appeal to both solidarity for the historically marginalized indigenous people in Bolivia as well as 
a broader appeal to the lowest income in society by promoting generous welfare spending. The 
administration combines nationalized industries, generous social spending and a promise for 
plurinational restructuring of government giving more power to indigenous groups in order to 
maintain its popular appeal. The indigenous party integration in Bolivia sits in stark contrast to 
Peru, which has had varying levels of indigenous integration historically but has lost most of its 
indigenous organization because of the violence from the Sendero Luminoso.  
Indigenous representation in the executive branch in Peru has changed between and 
within administrations over time. For example, Alejandro Toledo advocated explicitly for 
indigenous territorial rights while campaigning but has been severely criticized by advocates of 
indigenous rights for prioritizing economic growth through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
extractive industries in mining, lumber and others. His government has been followed by a few 
others who have either used their indigenous identity as a campaign tool or have ignored it 
completely. Peru’s indigenous movements are the least integrated in the institutionalized political 
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structure. Instead, indigenous and campesinos politics have materialized periodically as 
revolutionary groups such as Tupac Amaru’s rebellion and the infamous Sendero Luminoso 
communist rebellion. 
Ecuador is somewhere between Bolivia and Peru in terms of indigenous integration into 
its political life. The main indigenous party in Ecuador, Pachakutik (Movimiento de Unidad 
Plurinacional Pachakutik), formed in 1996 and began to participate as an active party within 
Ecuador’s multi-party democracy. It has maintained only 4-10 out of 100 seats in congress since 
its formation but has been criticized by many indigenous people as not representing them 
because it operates within a the established Ecuadorian government. In other words, many 
indigenous peoples in Ecuador are still dubious of the institutionalization of their movement and 
the idea of state to begin with. A common factor theses three countries share is the continued 
reliance on extractive industries like mining, natural gas and oil.  
 Each country relies undeniably on extractive practices as a huge part of its GDP, but 
there are differences in how each country is moving forward as well. Bolivia is has generally 
been reluctant to get rid of protectionist policies to trade and opening up to FDI that benefit 
domestic industry. Conversely, Peru has increased overall trade by reducing tariffs on exports 
and imports. Leaders in Ecuador similarly do not want to privatize the oil industry and is 
vulnerable to global price fluctuations in oil. In the past 3 decades, leadership within Peru has 
generally sought to grow the Peruvian economy by promoting trade openness and attracting 
international investors. Ecuador dollarized its economy when it experienced hyperinflation and 
its currency depreciated by 70%, and its economy is stagnating at a relatively low growth rate 
compared to Bolivia and Peru. 
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Peru continues to struggle in regards to water and air quality in areas near mining 
operation despite a general environmental improvements in the last 10 years. This general 
improvement can be attributed to international pressure to reduce greenhouse emissions and 
general improvements in technology. This general improvement is actually found in all three 
countries. One example of a failed policy implementation is the PAMA regulations for La Oroya, 
2007 world’s most polluted city. The Peruvian government put regulations reducing particulate 
emissions, air lead levels, cadmium levels, arsenic levels and an elimination of liquid discharge 
from the smelter. Doe run, the company that owns the smelter, reports a reduction in all of those 
areas but this has not been verified by any outside agency (Orihuela).   
Ecuador suffers mostly from deforestation from companies searching for more oil 
reserves and from oil operations polluting surrounding areas. As of 2004 15% of Ecuador is 
protected from oil exploration. This type of pollution is different from pollutions in both Peru 
and Bolivia, but is subject to similar forces for change. The environmental outlook for Ecuador is 
not very promising either. 
In conclusion three states with varying levels of indigenous integration in government are 
all fail to adhere to practices that protect indigenous communities from extractive practices such 
as mining, natural gas and oil. The following cases provide a more complete analysis of 
indigenous social movement in relation to specific environmental cases in each of these 
countries. The overall environmental outlook for local communities remains bleak in spite of the 
capacity to organize and mobilize that the national level.  
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The Case of La Oroya in Peru: 
In 1922, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation started mining copper and created an industrial 
smelter that quickly became infamous for releasing lead, Sulphur dioxide, cadmium and arsenic 
contaminants in the surrounding environment. There was virtually no regulation on air or water 
pollution by the Peruvian government at the time. Discontent among local hacienda owners and 
indigenous communities eventually led them to take action resulting in the first government 
commissioned remediation settlement. The government mandated the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation to buy polluted land making the Cerro de Pasco Corporation the largest landowner 
in the Andes by the late 1960s.2  In 1974, the smelter at La Oroya was nationalized and 
administrated by the state owned company CENTROMIN. It operated under CENTROMIN until 
it was bought by Doe Run in 1997 during Peru’s transition to a neoliberal political economy.3 
Doe Run is part of the larger U.S. multinational Renco Group which has mines and smelters in 
both South and North America.  
La Oroya has seen a lot of activism both in support of the implementation of stricter 
environmental regulations on behalf of public health but also in support of Doe Run’s continued 
existence in La Oroya because of the jobs the company provides. Although Peru and the Consejo 
Nacional del Medio Ambiente in Peru (CONAM) had environmental laws in place when the 
government initially began regulating La Oroya in the days of Cerro Pasco Corporation, there 
still was no environmental authority regulating the mining industry consistently until 2007.4 This 
change came after international pressure by human rights groups when La Oroya was ranked one 
                                                          
2 Becker, D. (2014). The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency. Mining, Class, and Power in 
Revolutionary Peru. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved 27 Jan. 2018, from https://www-degruyter-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/product/453057 
3 Orihuela, José Carlos. 2014. “The Environmental Rules of Economic Development: Governing Air Pollution from 
Smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya.” Journal of Latin American Studies46(01): 151–83. 
4 Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos 
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of the dirtiest cities in the world in 2007 by Forbes magazine.5 In order to understand the 
political pressures and institutional accountability failures of the CENTROMIN it is important to 
understand the economic and political history of Peru more broadly.  
After the economic struggles of what is commonly called the “Lost decade of Latin 
American” (1980s), Alberto Fujimori won the presidency against novelist Mario Vargas Llosa 
by appealing to populist sentiments. Although Fujimori heavily criticized Vargas Llosas’s 
preference for shock economic practices during the race, he quickly instituted austerity measures 
in order to cut inflation and attract stimulus packages from international institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).6 
Two years later, Fujimori instituted constitutional reform which ensured his party would have the 
majority of legislative seats undermining the very democratic institutions that got him elected.7 
Fujimori and his prime minister, Juan Carolos Hurtado Miller recognized the hardships 
economic shock would cause for the poorest Peruvians and installed a wide scale social 
emergency program that would cushion the effects felt by that population.8 Meanwhile, 
Fujimori’s government declared a state of emergency in response to the Maoist revolutionary 
group Sendero Luminoso which created havoc in the country side by conducting some of the 
most terrible intra-rural poor massacres in Peruvian history.9  
After Alberto Fujimori’s presidency ended in 2000, Peru was ready for a more left wing 
government, which it sought with Alejandro Toledo’s green liberalism and emphasis on the 
                                                          
5 Malone, Robert. 2013. “In Pictures: World's Dirtiest Cities.” Forbes. 
6 Graham, Carol. 1993. “Economic Austerity and the Peruvian Crisis: The Social Cost of Autocracy.” SAIS 
Review13(1): pg. 50 
7 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. “Alberto Fujimori.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alberto-Fujimori (January 29, 2018). 
8 Ibid. Graham, Carol 
9 Puente, Javier. 2017. “Making Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Geography & Ecology of Civil War.” Age of 
Revolutions. https://ageofrevolutions.com/2017/03/29/making-perus-sendero-luminoso-the-geography-ecology-of-
civil-war/ (January 29, 2018).  
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environment. Although Toledo himself identifies as indigenous,10 he largely preferred the 
neoliberal economic model that relied on foreign direct investment from multinational 
corporations which hurt many indigenous communities. Toledo’s party platform combined 
promises of policy addressing problems related to indigenous groups and environmental 
problems with neoliberal implementation of open markets to spur economic growth. These 
loyalties often contradicted one another forcing Toledo and his party to prioritize neoliberal 
economic policies over the preferences of regional indigenous groups. Toledo chose to prioritize 
what would ultimately help GDP growth in the economy by having lenient restrictions on the 
mining industry to facilitate as much macro-economic growth as possible. 
 The historical context in the case of Peru is fundamental to understanding the ways in 
which people thought about social movements and protests during Fujimori’s presidency and 
how the neoliberal economic model maintained its dominance over the Peruvian political elites. 
In rural areas contempt for neoliberal ideologies grew due to wide spread poverty and continued 
resentment for the traditional hierarchical structure that had existed in Latin America; the 
colonial age set the stage for the radical and violent guerilla group to firmly root itself.11 Javier 
Puente argues that much of the violence during the 1980s from Sendero Luminoso happened as a 
result of substantial droughts which heightened intra-community conflict based on scarce 
resources.12 Puente’s argument draws a clear connection between ecological problems, contempt 
for status-quo neoliberalism and social conflict in rural communities in Peru. Additionally, the 
historical context of social conflict in rural Peru, as manifested by el Sendero Luminoso, and the 
well-documented political corruption and repression by the Fujimori government provides an 
                                                          
10 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. “Alejandro Toledo.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alejandro-Toledo#ref1047906 (January 29, 2018). 
11 Ibid. Graham, Carol 
12 Ibid. Puente, Javier 
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understanding of the larger political conflicts, and the fragility of democratic institutions that 
coincide with conflicts over mining and smelting practices.  
 The case at La Oroya presents peasant, as opposed to indigenous, reactions to mining and 
smelting operations. Protests to environmental degradation at La Oroya tended to be ad hoc as 
opposed to sustained protests organized consistently by one or a few organizations. Although a 
large portion of the population in Peru identifies as indigenous they are far less likely to 
collectively advocate based on that identity. Peru has a less organized indigenous movement at 
the national level than both Bolivia and Ecuador despite having 45% of its population reporting 
to be indigenous and 37% reporting to be mestizo.13 In the long history of political debate and 
discourse regarding La Oroya, there are occasions in which indigenous groups are effected but, 
the larger political actors are primarily elites from Lima, international institutions and the local 
workers’ union. The case of La Oroya reflects a substantial policy change throughout the 
smelter’s existence, culminating in fairly strict environmental regulations due primarily to the 
severity of public health problems unique to the smelter. Unfortunately, much of the policy 
change has not resulted in action that effectively and consistently regulates air emissions, water 
contamination and implements soil remediation programs.  
 What is important in the case of La Oroya is that protesters do not muster support via 
appeals to indigenous identity. There are no organized indigenous groups advocating on their 
behalf, and appealing to a sense of comradery as a historically oppressed group, nor did Toledo’s 
government recognize this as an “indigenous” problem and advocated on behalf of the resident of 
La Oroya. This is true despite Toledo’s indigenous identity and La Oroya’s highly indigenous 
population. Unlike Evo Morales’ Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) party, Peru Posible (Toledo’s 
                                                          
13 “The World Factbook: PERU.” 2018. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/pe.html (January 29, 2018). 
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party) does not make explicit claims on behalf of organized indigenous communities in mining 
and extractive struggles. Perhaps, the ethnic makeup in highlands Peru does not lend itself to 
consolidated political activism on behalf of an indigenous identity. One scholar suggests that 
indigenismo identity constructed in Cusco is largely a result of performance and folklorization of 
indigenous identity as a way to play to tourist expectations and increase profits.14 That is 
indigenous organization and identification in Peru is a way of distinguishing itself compared to 
people from outside of Peru. The main reason indigenous leadership and organization has been 
stunted compared to neighboring countries is political suppression from el Sendero Luminoso who 
killed any leftist leaders who might represent a threat in terms of competition. Despite lack of 
indigenous organization, the case of La Oroya presents a useful false-positive in which 
environmental regulation is created but not enforced, and in which indigenous communities are 
affected but do not mobilize in any substantial way. This case also demonstrates the failure of 
institutions that were created simply to comply with international norms as opposed to an internal 
political will to implement an environmental agency to keep mining accountable.  
In 1990, the Código del Medio Ambiente y Recurso Nacionales established that 
environmental authority was under federal control, but the law was amended in 1991 to promote 
foreign direct investment.15 Structural adjustment programs brought on by the World Bank 
contributed to the privatization of much of the mining industry but also established 
environmental regulation which previously did not exist.16 Although the passage of this law to 
begin with marks what many would consider a success, the Ministry of Energy and Mining could 
                                                          
14 McFaddenb, Heather Faith. 2012. ProQuest “Constructing Indigenous Identity in Peru: From Indigenismo to 
Toursim.” https://search.proquest.com/docview/1282648992?pq-origsite=summon  
15http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/76865407EB58EB6F05257E2E0050C544/$FILE/DL
_708_LeyPromoci%C3%B3nDeInversionesEnElSectorMinero.pdf 
16 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/410671468079729976/pdf/335450a1PE0studio0Mineria.pdf 
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not strictly enforce those laws. Although the law for environmental regulation in mining was 
formally established in 1992-3, air quality standards were not specified until 1996, remediation 
was not planned until 1997, and neither of these standards were actually enforced.17  
 The political economy and democratic institutions in Peru could not support the degree of 
environmental regulation administered by the World Bank. Instead of environmental regulation 
at La Oroya coming about via an autonomous political process, it came as a result of 
conditionality on World Bank loans which encouraged privatization as part of structural 
adjustment.18 Within the Fujimori government there was a deep seated distrust for how 
government itself could effectively run the mining industry. In an interview with María 
Chappuis, and César Polo, two central figures in Fujimori’s mining ministry argued that “The big 
idea was to promote private investment because the state had failed.”19 The state wanted to 
attract new investment and cut its own spending in order to boost economic growth and 
reallocate tax dollars. Environmental reform came only as a result of World Bank officials 
advocating and ultimately making loans conditional on its behalf. There was a distrust of the 
state’s capacity to either run a successful company at all or additionally implement 
environmental standards the state hadn’t actually wanted. The state had no ownership of the 
green reforms imposed on it by the World Bank. This idea is made abundantly clear when we 
consider the 1992 air quality standards which were not actually specified until 1996, or the soil 
remediation plan which was not made until Doe Run bought the plant in 1997. Neither plan 
actually was implemented by CENTROMIN nor Doe Run.20  
                                                          
17 Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos (172) 
18 Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos 
19 Interview with Maria Chappuis, 15 Feb. 2008, and César Polo, 3 Apr. 2008 from José Carlos Orihuela 
20 Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos 
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 The state’s intentions of actually regulating the La Oroya smelter are made clear when 
one looks at the resources the federal government actually put into the regulatory agency for 
mining. The Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales (DGAA), which was created in 1992 as 
part of a deal with the World Bank, had only 6 technical staff members measuring the impacts of 
the smelter and overseeing compliance with regulations.21 Meanwhile, the national 
environmental authority (CONAM) took a subsidiary role as the ministries remained the more 
important environmental authorities. In 2006, another organizational shift put the responsibility 
of overseeing soil remediation to the Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería 
(OSINERGMIN). 
In 2007, OSINERGMIN put the first environmental fine of US$ 250,000 on Doe Run for 
failing to adhere to air quality standards and dumping effluent into the Mantaro River in three 
places without treatment or permits, for lacking a management system for Sulphur dioxide 
emissions and for practicing careless transportation of hazardous material.22 The fine comes after 
4 extensions to meet environmental standards of the remediation plan given to the company by 
the Ministry of Energy in the 10 years Doe Run had operated the facility. Doe Run claimed on 
several occasions that it could not adhere to the remediation plan nor invest in greener 
technology to reduce initial pollution. The reduction plan was estimated to cost US$ 196 million, 
which the company claimed it could not pay. Shortly thereafter a journalist form El Comercio 
discovered that the company had remitted US$ 100 million in profits to the Renco Group in the 
U.S.23 With Doe Run’s financial stability at question, there was a wave of anti-environmental 
                                                          
21 World Bank, Riqueza y sostenibilidad p. 65 
22 OSINERGMIN, ‘Informe: examen especial sobre normas de protección y conservación del ambiente realizado en 
el complejo metalúrgico La Oroya’, Lima, 2007 José Carlos Orihuela 
23 Diversos, artículos. 1970. “Contaminacion en la Oroya - Perú.” Centromín y Doe Run en desacuerdo sobre 
descontaminación de La Oroya. http://oroyaperu.blogspot.com/2007/12/centromn-y-doe-run-en-desacuerdo-
sobre.html (January 29, 2018). 
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protest so that the town would maintain jobs, leading to a 5th extension on remediation and 
adherence to air quality in 2009, when the company also filed for bankruptcy. The Ministry of 
Energy and Mining then revoked Doe Run’s extension, fined the company US$ 163,046,495.00 
for failing to meet its environmental obligations specified in Programa de Adecuación y Manejo 
Ambiental or Environmental Remediation and Management Program (PAMA) within 
CENTROMIN.24 Doe Run filed for bankruptcy and failed to build the sulfuric acid plant that 
would curb emissions. The plant shut down for three years. Doe Run appealed the proceedings in 
2012, where the court stayed consistent with the 2009 ruling maintaining that Doe Run is 
required to complete the PAMA environmental standards to continue operations.25 Zinc and lead 
mining circuits were restarted in 2012 but were then halted in 2014 after infighting among 
creditors. Shortly thereafter, the group of creditors decided to sell the plant. Doe Run owes up 
US$ 600 million to a group of about 100 creditors and the creditors took severe loses.26 
In 2013, CENTROMIN implemented an air quality standard that reduce from 80 ug/m3 to 20 
ug/m3 of damaging substances for all mining operations but allowed certain companies extensions 
on when they can meet those standards; Doe Run was one of those companies.27 The ministry of 
Mining and Energy promised to continue to try and reduce the levels of pollutants in the air but 
still have failed. According to a 2016 study conducted by Associación Proderechos Humanos 
(APRODEH), AIDA and Yale researchers, there are still levels of lead, cadmium and sulfur 
dioxide that exceed the government’s standards in the air at La Oroya.28 
                                                          
24 http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3004/C-136_Eng.pdf  
25 https://peru.com/2012/05/17/actualidad/economia-y-finanzas/junta-acreedores-doe-run-peru-elegira-al-liquidador-
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27 CASE OF THE COMMUNITY OF LA OROYA, PERU. AIDA: Protecting our Right to a Healthy Environment . 
http://www.aida-americas.org/sites/default/files/La%20Oroya%20Fact%20Sheet%20ENG%2014-02-12.pdf 
28 Wooten, Nicholas. Heavy Metal Air Pollution in La Oroya, Peru. Yale School of Forestry Environmental Studies 
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This decision to let Doe Run bypass environmental requirements by several administrations 
was based off of the argument that Doe Run provided economic opportunities that trump 
environmental degradation and public health crisis in La Oroya. This argument is often made by 
Peruvian politicians in regards to extractive practices, putting the ‘greater public good’ ahead of 
those suffering directly from the degradation. These governments balance social, environmental 
and economic considerations.  This is exactly the argument made by Fujimori, Toledo, Alan 
García, Ollanta Humala Tasso, and Pedro Pablo Kuchzynski. It is important to note that the La 
Oroya case is a political battle between domestic and international bureaucratic agencies, 
creditors, and the multinational corporation Doe Run. Although the World Bank initially 
implemented environmental regulations as conditionality it left a questionable Peruvian 
democracy in charge of the implementation of those regulations. It was not until more recently 
that Doe Run was held, temporarily, to the standards specified in the PAMA agreement when 
moved under the authority of OSINERGMIN. Although indigenous communities are part of the 
population effected by the pollution at the plant in La Oroya, the entire political battle was 
confined to bureaucracies. Only when jobs within the town were threatened were residents 
motivated enough to protest in favor of Doe Run, as opposed to against it. Doe Run provides a 
‘best case scenario’ in terms of political forces applied to change environmental standards.  The 
environmental degradation and public health risks were so egregious that international 
institutions, human rights groups, and technocrats within particular government agencies agreed 
that something needed to be done, but the government still failed to enforce the environmental 
standards put in place. In the larger Peruvian environmental struggle against mining and 
extractive practices, the level of indigenous organization found in La Oroya is commonplace but 
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the environmental impact at La Oroya is the most extreme form environmental degradation in 
Peru.  
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The Case of Texaco in Ecuador 
 
 The case of Texaco and Chevron in the Oriente region of Ecuador presents one of the 
most contentious political and legal battles in the history of environmental litigation. Oil is the 
most important export in the Ecuadorian economy making the legal battle over land rights in oil 
rich indigenous territories in the heart of the Ecuadorian Amazon one of the highest profile 
environmental battles in history. It also presents a case in which the fragmentation of indigenous 
political organizations as well as corruption has led to an environmental outcome that allows the 
parties on the left to save face without taking responsibility for the pollution caused by Petro 
Ecuador. Ecuador’s historical dependence on oil as an export, the salience of indigenous politics 
surrounding the region, and the ecological importance of the Amazon more broadly have 
produced an extremely contentious case for all parties involved. The fight over land rights and 
pollution in the Oriente region demonstrates well how varying commitments to formalized 
political institutions can function as extremely important bargaining tool for indigenous groups. 
The case of Chevron-Texaco in Ecuador resulted in an $8 billion settlement issued by the 
Ecuadorian government against Chevron for environmental remediation. This ruling is not an 
environmental win because it is incorrectly ruled, unenforceable, and actually avoids 
environmental cleanup and remediation on behalf of the Ecuadorian government. Political 
mobilization of indigenous groups at an institutional level failed to keep the Ecuadorian 
government under President Rafael Correa accountable. Most of the academics who trace the 
litigation against Texaco will tend to focus on the actions of Steve Donziger, but this account 
will focus primarily on the change of indigenous institutions, and they failed to influence the 
litigation against Texaco. The case of Texaco in Ecuador shows the increasing importance of 
organized indigenous mobilization to begin with, how the timing and manner of indigenous 
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institutionalization can greatly influence how effective indigenous politics can move 
environmental policy, the somewhat tenuous alliance of the Pachakutik with more traditionally 
left leaning parties, and the diversity of interest that indigenous groups have over such a large 
land mass.  
In 1972, Gulf Oil and Texaco Petroleum Company started exporting oil when the Trans-
Ecuadorian pipeline was completed.29This came shortly after a military coup led by General 
Guillermo Rodríguez Lara against the last 5 non-consecutive José Velasco regimes. Two years 
later Ecuador joined OPEC, making the country a member of one of the most powerful 
commodity cartels in the world. Oil in Ecuador has been the subject of political tensions since its 
inception in 1972 because of the role that land has in terms of power in Ecuador. This is evident 
from contentious debates that came as a result of the 1964 agrarian reform that redistributed land 
to a large section of the population but did not truly address the semi-feudal economic system 
that many Ecuadorian campesinos still faced. Although the utilization of land for oil has been 
debated for such a long time and the role of oil has fluctuated because of global price 
fluctuations, Ecuador on average has become more dependent on oil as time has gone on. Similar 
to other cases of countries dependent on a few commodity products, Ecuador’s economy was 
extremely sensitive to fluctuations in prices. When the demand for oil in the 1980s decreased, 
Ecuador dropped the price of oil per barrel despite other OPEC requests to maintain the current 
                                                          
29Gillis, Carly. “Ecuador vs Texaco-Chevron: A Brief History.” Counterspill.org 
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oil price.30 The Ecuadorian government needed the revenue from oil so desperately that it was 
willing to deviate from OPEC price controls. Oil extraction inevitably leads to a certain amount 
of environmental degradation which can be devastating for an environment as ecologically rich 
and biodiverse as the Amazon rainforest. The Texaco Corporation’s and later Chevron Texaco’s 
operations there led to the largest fine in environmental lawsuit in history. After decades of legal 
proceedings the Ecuadorian courts fined Texaco and Chevron US$ 8.6 billion in 2011 rewarded 
to the plaintiffs of Lago Agrio and for environmental cleanup and remediation. Similar to the 
case of La Oroya in Peru, and TIPNIS in Bolivia, the battle for environmental cleanup against 
Texaco is fought by both international actors and indigenous communities. The main 
international actors in this case were a team of U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers conducting the class 
action lawsuit. Indigenous organizations did not play as large of a role in advocating for 
                                                          
30 Ibid. Gillis 
Figure 1 
Oil Rents in Ecuador 1970-2015 
as a percentage of GDP 
 Source: World Bank  
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environmental cleanup because they lacked consolidated power within the federal government. 
The political obstacles of environmental cleanup are unfortunate due to the persistent level of 
environmental degradation in the region.  
A Harvard Study conducted in 1993 found that 33 nano-grammes of hydrocarbons were 
found in samples of drinking and bathing water in the Oriente region were Texaco operated. The 
study posits that any traceable amount of hydrocarbons in water leads to a significantly higher 
chance of cancer.31 Cancer rates in oil producing regions of Ecuador are actually 31% whereas 
cancer rates in the rest of the country are 12.3% for the rest of the country.32 These results are 
particularly troubling when one considers that 65% of Ecuador’s Amazon is zoned for oil 
activities.33 Similar to the other cases in this study, the case against Texaco in Ecuador is one that 
was most likely to gain successful policy outcomes due to the level of degradation and the 
international attention case attracted. This was the largest suit against any oil company in history 
but it still failed to clean up or address many of the environmental and public health issues 
associated with oil extraction in the region. One possible lens for understanding this failed case is 
through the manner in which indigenous organizations came to form the Pachakutik party out of 
the CONAIE. The Pachakutik represents the worst-case scenario of social movement 
institutionalization in which the majority of movement’s original support quickly became 
dubious of the Pachakutik’s intentions.  
 Ecuador has had a relatively short history of indigenous organization in the context of 
colonial history of Latin America. It is not until the 20th century indigenous communities began 
                                                          
31 Edwin, Joeseph. “Toxic Threat in Ecuador Rainforest.” New Straits Times. 
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32 Acosta, Alberto “La Maldición de la Abundancia” (Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, 2009), 75 
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to organize into unified social movements and later enter the national political scene. The 
emergence of organized indigenous groups came largely as a result of the economic arrangement 
based around the hacienda so common to Latin America. The hacienda model is one often 
likened to feudalism because the small number of land owners have the majority of the country’s 
wealth and everyone else is left economically and therefore politically disenfranchised. The 
hacienda economic model came about as a result of the colonial model which created 
infrastructure to export agricultural products and raw materials such as oil, minerals and natural 
gas. The result was a rigid social and economic hierarchy in which indigenous groups were at the 
bottom. With the exception of small and unorganized indigenous rebellions, this system was not 
effectively protested by indigenous groups until the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE) appealed to 
indigenous communities in the 1930s. The PSE won several seats but prioritized its urban 
working base over rural indigenous communities.34 Ecuador’s communist party also appealed to 
a coalition of indigenous communities with the formation of the Ecuadorian Indian Federation 
(FEI) in 1944. Both groups failed to meet the needs of their indigenous constituencies and fell 
out of favor with indigenous groups. The FEI, however, successfully linked serrano indigenous 
communities together for the time which has been critical for later indigenous movements.35 The 
PSE and the FEI were the first major alliances with parties on the left and indigenous groups. 
Although the socialist and the communist parties shared a deep resentment for the hacienda 
model with indigenous peoples, there were fundamental disagreements over policy goals 
between the left and indigenous people.  
                                                          
34 Pallares, Amalia. From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman: Univiersity of Oklahoma Perss. 
35 Van Cott, Donna Lee, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethinic Politics. New 
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Similar to Peru and Bolivia, the alignment of indigenous movements with political parties 
on the left is not surprising given the shared goal of overthrowing the hacienda system of 
government. It is not until the Agrarian Reform Laws of 1964 and 1973, both published under 
military dictatorships, that the hacienda system was truly challenged. General Guillermo 
Rodríguez Lara, the head of the 1972 coup said that the “Indian problem” would disappear and 
that “We all become white men when we accept the goals of a national culture.”36 The agrarian 
reform laws were largely encouraged by the U.S. because of the fear that a leftist revolution or 
similar to the Cuban Revolution would emerge as a result of the continued brutality of the 
hacienda system. Although the goals of these programs were far from benevolent attempts to 
make a more equitable society, they did in fact weaken indigenous identity in some profound 
ways. The Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI) was an organization that was led by non-
indigenous urban intellectuals that worked to organize members of the lowest socio-economic 
class with indigenous groups throughout the country.  The idea that social status determined 
one’s life prospects rather than ethic ties grew in popularity and had real political consequences. 
Indigenous peoples largely organized as members of the rural working class instead of on ethnic 
lines. This process is considered campesinismo by political scientist Amalia Pallares.37  The 
creation of The Confederation of Quichua People of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), Ecuador’s first 
trans-provincial indigenous organization in 1972, was an effort to bridge class and ethnic 
political identities.38 That same year, Rodriguez Lara strategically staged a military coup shortly 
after the completion of the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline that expands from Ecuador’s Oriente 
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Region to the coast was completed.39  ECUARUNARI experienced a great deal success initially 
but soon fell victim to the same subordination of indigenous leaders by their white and mestizo 
counterparts as the FEI and the PSE experienced. 
The compulsory voting system in Ecuador was also disadvantageous for indigenous 
social movements, because indigenous people were more likely to vote for left leaning parties 
who only tangentially advocated for indigenous rights. The left was far more appealing in 
comparison to their conservative counterparts. Parties on the left had less of an obligation to their 
indigenous constituents, compared to their lower class urban base. Instead, parties had an 
incentive to pander to swing voters in order to sway public appeal in their direction. This 
recurring problem was so apparent that CONAIE’s leaders systematically discouraged voting 
despite the legal obligation Ecuadorian citizens had to vote. It instead wanted to construct the 
indigenous social movement outside of the formalized political institutions in order to form a 
more unified indigenous base.40 CONAIE advocated boycotting the elections of 1989 to 1992 so 
that their political agendas would be taken seriously by the left.41 
Although indigenous movements have generally aligned with the left, the Confederation 
of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) formed during the Luis Febres Cordero 
Munoz administration in November, 1986. CONAIE had concerned with issues related to 
territorial rights since its inception, but clarified its position in 1990 with a list of sixteen 
demands including self-rule, political autonomy, respect for customs and “Indian” participation 
in decisions regarding oil exploration on indigenous land.42 These demands were seen as a fairly 
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radical political statement that sought complete national autonomy that rivaled the Ecuadorian 
state. Also in 1990, Petroecuador gained complete control over the facilities in the Oriente region 
created initially by Texaco.43 The Ecuadorian state relied so heavily on oil from the region that 
the prospect of a parallel state organization in oil territory threatened the Ecuadorian 
government. In 1992, CONAIE organized and executed the largest protests in Ecuadorian history 
in which thousands of indigenous people marched from Puyo to Quito demanding recognition 
and autonomy.44 
By 1995 President Rodrigo Borjo refused to recognize the political autonomy of 
indigenous groups but instead offered more than a million hectares of land.45 CONAIE continued 
to use mobilization as opposed institutionalized strategy out of fear that their political needs will 
be sidelined like in the case of the FEI, PSE and ECUARUNARI. In 1994, CONAIE formed a 
coalition with other groups in order to defeat the neoliberal referendum proposed by President 
Sixto Durán Bellén.  The coalition successfully campaigned for electoral regulations that would 
facilitate easier registration for political parties and permit the formation of interparty alliances. 
This coalition consisted of people who worked middle-class sectors that opposed the 
privatization of social security and other similar policies. CONAIE’s coalition preferred 
advocacy through protests and boycotts as opposed to mobilizing their electorate to the polls.46 
With Durán’s defeat in 1995 and more lenient rules allowing for party formation, 
CONAIE faced an important question for the future of indigenous politics in Ecuador: Should 
CONAIE form a political party that participates in the formal Ecuadorian political system? This 
                                                          
43 “Endgame in Ecuador.” Chevron in Ecuador: A Timeline of Events. 
https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/ecuador/timeline (February 12, 2018). 
44 Ibid. Mijeski and Beck 
45 Ibid. Pallares 
46 Ibid. Mijeski and Beck 38 
 VonZabern 40 
 
question was the subject of debate between leadership from the two major groups within 
CONAIE. The Oriente region, represented by a major political confederation in the Amazon 
called the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Amazon of Ecuador 
(CONFENAIAE), advocated for electoral participation. The Sierra coalition within CONAIE, 
represented by ECUARUNARI, worried that problems specific to indigenous peoples would get 
coopted by other parties as side issues.47 Their worries were not unwarranted given the fact that 
50% of the state’s budget is accounted for by oil revenue by 1994, and the history of cooptation 
of indigenous groups historically in Ecuador. Additionally, 50% of the budget went to pay back 
international debt, meaning working within the Ecuadorian government would mean working 
within the Washington Consensus.48 Luis Macas, the president of CONAIE during 1995 argued 
that CONAIE might be sidelined by other parties that have more widespread appeal. 49  
In 1993, CONAIE’s congress decided that they would participate in elections but no 
leaders from CONAIE would hold public office. Macas, himself, denied an invitation to run as 
vice president during the 1996 elections.50 Later that year, an abrupt change of doctrine led 
CONAIE to join forces with Coordinator of Social Movements (CMS), and Nuevo País to form 
the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement (MUPP-NP), most commonly referred to as 
Pachakutik.51 Luis Macas soon became a politician for Pachakutik while CONAIE maintained its 
position as a separate organization that will continue its mobilization strategy. The word 
Pachakutik itself is a Kichwa word that means change and rebirth, which could not better 
describe the complete about face CONAIE had as a strategy.52 Maintaining its institutional 
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independence, CONAIE would continue with its strategy to mobilize informally while 
Pachakutik will pursue an electoral strategy. This plan might have worked if the institutional ties 
between the two organizations were not as apparent. The Pachakutik had a relatively successful 
showing in its first election when it won 20% of the vote. It, however, attracted a smaller percent 
of the electorate over time as more indigenous groups dissociated with the party. Not only did 
CONAIE lose much of its power, but Pachakutik’s electoral failure delegitimized the perception 
that an indigenous party could represent all indigenous peoples at a national level; leaving 
advocates of universal indigenous politics such as territorial rights and conservation outside the 
center of power.  
The class action lawsuit against Texaco, Aguinda vs Ecuador, began in 1993 when 
Steven Donzier filed a suit in the Southern District of New York over contamination in Lago 
Agrio and surrounding areas in Ecuador. This came the same year that Texaco sold its facilities 
to the Ecuadorian State.53 Two years later, the serving deputy Minister of Energy and Mines 
signed an agreement with Texaco requiring the company to remediate 37.5% of the Orient oil 
sites. This percentage reflected Texaco’s ownership stake from 1977 through the dissolution of 
the venture. It additionally claimed to investigate 133 wells sites and seven spill areas, claiming 
to invest a total of US $40 million in work.54 The rest of the pollution was left in the hands of 
Petroecuador.55 However, both Texaco and the Ecuadorian government failed to completely 
cleanup the environment polluted by their operations claiming the other is responsible for the 
environmental degradation. The major short coming in this case was that Texaco only had an 
obligation to clean up about one third of the actual pollution it had caused since 1972. The joint 
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operation caused far more damage than what Texaco was mandated to cleanup, and not the fight 
was to decide who would bear the burden of the damages they both caused.  
In 1996, the Sixto Durán Ballén government had appointed a new deputy for the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines, leaving the organization who agreed to hold Texaco accountable with a 
complete change of personnel. Shortly thereafter, the new president, Abdalá Bucaram, reversed 
the countries decision on the initial Aguinda settlement.56 Litigation continued in New York, but 
the death of Judge Broderick caused serious problems for the prosecutors. Broderick was far 
more sympathetic to the indigenous people suffering as a result of oil pollution and was willing 
to try the case. Broderick’s replacement Judge Rakoff quickly dismissed the suit arguing that the 
authority of the U.S. judiciary “does not include a general writ to right the world’s wrongs.”57 
Texaco strategically agreed to be tried in Ecuadorian jurisdiction right after the government in 
Ecuador certified that Texaco had fully performed the oil-field remediation and would be 
“released, absolved, and discharged forever” from any further liability in the region.58 
Prosecutors preferred American courts for the trial because they feared Ecuadorian judges would 
be bribed or manipulated by oil interests. The political environment in Ecuador favored oil 
companies who contributed more money to the government than any other industry in the 
country over indigenous groups whose center of power operated outside of normal politics. 
In 1999, the Environmental Management Law passed under the Jamil Mahuad’s regime 
that was a center left coalition that moved slightly to the right by 2000. This law provided hope 
for indigenous peoples that a coalition with may work. The act along with Forest Law (article 
39) stated that indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples will have priority in the use of 
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community lands and forest products and that the local authorities must consult these peoples 
before issuing policies regarding their lands.59 Mahuad’s legislation largely came out of fear 
from the indigenous uprising as opposed to a legal democratic process. The 1997 protest led by 
CONAIE led an influential protest for constitutional reform and for keeping oil companies 
accountable played a pivotal role in creating the law.60 The enactment of the Environmental 
Management Law demonstrates how CONAIE’s grass roots strategy mobilizing popular protests 
has been more effective in changing policy than working within the unstable political institutions 
in Ecuador. This law also made the prospect of transferring the case against Texaco and the 
Petroecuador to Ecuadorian courts more attainable.  
The next critical moment in the case against Texaco and now Chevron, who acquired 
Texaco in 2000, was in 2003 when the new government under Rafael Correa announced a 
criminal investigation into two lawyers, officials from Petroecuador and the former Ecuadorian 
government. All of whom worked on the 1995 settlement with Texaco that understated the 
responsibility Texaco had in polluting the Oriente region.61 The Chevron Texaco Corporation 
argued that it was independent of Texaco INC. which operated prior to Chevron’s involvement 
and therefore Chevron had no financial obligations to clean up the environment. The courts 
disagreed after a judicial inspections that lasted from 2004 to 2008 were conducted. An 
independent expert recommended that Chevron pay US$ 7-16 billion. 62 Ultimately the court 
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ruled that Chevron should pay $8.6 billion for damages to cleanup and remediation projects 
around Lago Agrio.  
The case becomes more complicated when Chevron gets the international arbitration 
panel to intervene in 2009, and then files a countersuit for racketeering in 2011 in U.S. courts 
which found that Donziger manipulated evidence, and bribed the judge that ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs. The ruling in Ecuador remains despite a U.S. court’s decision. It is not simply that the 
infrastructure in the Ecuadorian government was not strong enough to make Chevron enforce the 
court’s decision, it is that the decision was unenforceable. The Ecuadorian government actually 
had an incentive to keep the ruling because they would no longer be responsible for cleaning up 
the damages from Petroecuador who also polluted a substantial amount in the region.  
The main political actors behind the decision against Texaco were foreign lawyers as 
opposed to an organized indigenous coalition demanding higher environmental standards across 
the region. The Pachakutik had virtually no power over the case of environmental degradation in 
the Oriente region. President Correa finally implemented a resettlement against Texaco calling 
for Chevron to pay more money for remediation. In doing so Correa conveniently removed the 
burden of cleanup from his government and appealed to much of the indigenous population. The 
resettlement called for cleanup but the Ecuadorian government was in no position to actually 
enforce its decision. It is undeniable that the organizational infrastructure provided by CONAIE 
was pivotal for building institutions like the Environmental Management Act of 1999 which 
happened independently of Pachakutik. Organized national indigenous protest through CONAIE 
was far more successful at moving policy than the Pachakutik which worked within the formal 
political framework.  
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Case in Bolivia 
 Evo Morales’ ascent to power in 2006 through his socialist MAS party represented a 
period of hope for indigenous communities in Bolivia. As the first leader in Bolivian history who 
identifies himself indigenous, Morales took pride in doing as much for indigenous people as 
possible. Likewise, indigenous people were excited by the opportunity created by placing a 
member of their own historically marginalized group in the most powerful position in the 
country. In addition to indigenous groups, Morales appealed to the urban poor with his message 
opposing American imperialism and promising welfare programs to improve the quality of life 
for Bolivia’s poorest citizens. Both of these alliances are largely consistent with anti-imperialism 
ideologies so common on the left. It is however, difficult to comply fully with the demands of 
each of these constituencies simultaneously. The current dependence on natural resource 
extraction as a main source of income to fund welfare programs comes at the cost of territorial 
autonomy of several indigenous areas because mineral and natural gas rich areas are often found 
in rural areas where people tend to organize as indigenous. Similar to Ecuador, the co-optation of 
indigenous politics with socialists’ ideology in Bolivia is a paradox because the capital 
requirements to fund egalitarian social programs is paid for by energy and mineral resources that 
degrade the environment and are often found on indigenous territory. In addition to showing a 
successful case of indigenous institutionalization, and exposing the paradoxical relationship 
between indigenous groups and the left, TIPNIS exposes the diversity of indigenous groups in 
relation to the environment.  
 The Isiboro Secure National Park (TIPNIS) was created in 1965 and was one of the 
earliest national parks in Bolivia. The Bolivian state allocated 1,200,000 hectares of lowland 
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Amazon rainforest in part to acknowledge the indigenous groups who lived there.63 The park 
served the dual purpose of saving government money because they did not have to pay for 
infrastructure in the park, and allowing isolated groups to maintain their more traditional 
lifestyles. The park did not have any financial investment from the rest of the state in terms of 
physical infrastructure, health programs, or other government services.64 In 1990, TIPNIS was 
officially recognized as both a national park and indigenous territory after the March for 
Territory and Dignity, where residents marched to La Paz demanding territorial rights. Since 
then the park has been co-managed by between the National Protected Areas Agency (SERNAP) 
and the TIPNIS authorities. Approximately 63 Mojenos-Trinitario, Chimane and Yuracare 
communities live in various settlements mostly in the northern part of the territory along the 
rivers Secure, Isiboro and Ichoa that fall under the jurisdiction of TIPNIS.65 The southern section 
of the territory is additionally broken up into two governing authorities within the jurisdiction of 
SERNAP, and there are two sub-sections called TIPNIS Subcentral and Secure Subcentral each 
with 37 and 14 communities respectively. The southern territory has groups from Quechua and 
Aymara decent who have been migrating into the park to establish coca farms for past thirty 
years.66  
 The road project at the heart of the political controversy in TIPNIS began in 2010 in an 
effort to connect the small town of Villa Tunari to San Ignacio de Moxos running through the 
middle of the park. The goal of the project is to connect the departments of Cochabama to 
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Beni.67 By connecting two major cities through the park, the Bolivian government is both 
bringing national political presence into a territory that is governed independently and helping to 
create physical infrastructure that would assist in hydrocarbon extraction. The road was routed 
past several hydrocarbon reserves already authorized for extraction under previous government 
contracts. The project was originally financed by the Brazilian Development Bank as part of a 
larger Latin American development project trying to increase efficiency of primary commodities 
extraction and exportation though funding infrastructure.68  
 TIPNIS Subcentral immediately came to a consensus agreement in opposition despite 
President Evo Morales’ claim that NGOs were the main culprit behind the movement against the 
development project.69 Ironically, Evo Morales strengthened indigenous territorial rights 
originally solidified in 1990, with the 2009 constitution. TIPNIS Subcentral is actually evoking 
the statute in the Bolivian constitution “to self-determination and territoriality, to create and 
administer their own systems, means, and networks of communication, to the collective 
ownerships of land and territories and to live in a healthy environment, with appropriate 
management and exploitation of the ecosystems.”70 Opposition to the project spread across 
Bolivia as the overt contradiction between Morales’ original message and his pursuit of the road 
project became apparent. To truly understand the seemingly paradoxical behavior of the Morales 
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regime in promoting the TIPNIS road project when there are also overt policies aimed at 
protecting the environment, it is necessary to trace the political history of the MAS party.  
 Prior to 1985, Bolivia had a number of economic policies under import substitution 
industrialization prioritizing domestic production over foreign production so the country could 
build a base of industrialized infrastructure. Under the leftist coalition called Democratic Popular 
Unity (UDP), Bolivia created a number of protections such as higher taxation on imports that 
discouraged foreign markets to enter in the Bolivian market.71 The policy came after a post-
colonial societal structure that relied heavily on exporting a few raw materials and imported 
finished products. As the economic crisis of the 1980s worsened, a number of countries in the 
region, including Bolivia faced hyperinflation and a sudden drop in the price of commodities. 
Finally, in 1985 the UDP fell apart and elections were held. The subsequent government led by 
Paz Estenssoro followed Chile’s model of opening up markets which occurred during the 
Augusto Pinochet regime. In order to be suitable for international financial institutions, the 
Bolivians had to remove barriers to import foreign products and implement austerity measures 
drafted by Harvard University Students under Jeffery Sachs.72 As opposed to a slower transition 
to neoliberalism as in the case of Costa Rica, Bolivia faced Shock Therapy, an abrupt transition 
to an internationally integrated economy. Inflation rates dropped from 8,170% to 9% within a 
year, but 35,000 factory workers and 20,000 miners lost their jobs.73 This model had detrimental 
effects for the livelihoods of citizens within Bolivia because their domestically protected 
production could not compete with products that had already been competing in international 
markets. The national mining corporation (COMIBOL) for example closed leading to dispersed 
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unemployment throughout the country as opposed to urban centers.74The sudden economic shift 
had number of implications that help explain the rise of MAS as a socialist-indigenous coalition 
that has since become the dominant political party in the current Bolivian political system.  
First there was a huge migration to cities, which caused a dramatic growth of urban 
population and poverty rates. The largest cities in the country, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa 
Cruz took many displaced mine workers and farmers. This process was crucial for bringing 
together groups of people with strong indigenous identity with the proletariat organization of the 
city. A shared history of marginalization created a natural alliance and strong political 
connections between the urban left and indigenous groups that were displaced following the 
economic reforms. With the organizational skills of the urban working class through the 
Izquierda Unidad (IU) party coinciding with a growing indigenous presences created a sense of 
“Indigenous nationalism” that previously did not have as wide spread of a following.75 As a 
result of the 1985 neoliberal reforms a number of indigenous leaders from the coca industry who 
had close ties with the growing urban indigenous population aligned with the IU in Cochabamba.  
The IU vote share increased from 2% in 1985 to 33% in 1989 in Cochabamba.76 The elections in 
Cochabamba marked the beginning what would be Bolivia’s hegemonic MAS party because it 
showed the power of an alliance between the urban left and indigenous groups.  
Indigenous nationalism also increased in the Chapare region as more indigenous people 
chose to work on coca farms. The coca industry attracted a large proportion of unemployed 
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campesinos because it provided fairly high wages and produced a highly sought after product. 
The coca leaf was particularly important for the creation of the MAS party because it provided a 
steady source of income for the political base of unionized coca farmers, indigenous campesinos, 
and displaced workers. Coca is critical for the production of cocaine, which became extremely 
prominent during 1980s. In addition to its use for cocaine, the coca leaf is an extremely 
important cultural domestic commodity. For those who performed physically demanding jobs at 
high altitudes, coca helped alleviate the symptoms of mild altitude sickness which is extremely 
common for workers in Bolivia’s highlands. The U.S. proclaimed a ‘War on Drugs’ around the 
same time coca became an increasingly important domestically produced commodity for 
Bolivians. The U.S. targeted suppliers of coca leaves in Bolivia in addition to cartels in 
Columbia instead of addressing exclusively the demand within the U.S.77 The increased salience 
of coca both culturally and economically made the suppression of coca by the U.S. a particularly 
sensitive matter for most Bolivians. Cocaleros and most of the Bolivian public alike perceived 
the attack on coca as an attack on their sovereignty and an attack on indigenous cultural 
traditions by the U.S.  
 The creation of the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP) by top Cocaleros 
marked the next big step in the creation of the MAS party. In 1995 the ASP political party 
formed from the coca farming union, the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of 
Bolivia (CSUTCB). Shortly after the 1994 “March for Life” which organized a large group to 
march from Chapare to La Paz, the ASP championed indigenous rights as well as advocated for 
policies supporting the coca industry. Also in 1994 the Popular Participation Law strengthened 
the role of municipalities, causing local industries like coca production in Chapare more power. 
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The ASP along with the IU both capitalized on the growing anti-neo-colonial sentiment reaching 
the wider public in Bolivia by identifying the foreign economic meddling under the Washington 
Consensus as the causal mechanism for the low standards of living for the urban poor and the 
lack of autonomy felt by indigenous groups. They argued that structural adjustment leading to 
neoliberal policies gave preferential treatment to foreign investors and left the majority of the 
Bolivian population behind.  
 The IU and ASP parties formed an electoral alliance bridging the gap between indigenous 
and class divides in Bolivia’s opposition movement. This strategy was effective in some regions 
but still had not consolidated the support it needed. In 1997, the IU-ASP coalition only won 4% 
of the national vote but 17.5% of the vote in Cochabmba. Additionally, the party won 6 members 
to the national congress78 The ASP and the IU lacked the charismatic leadership to effectively 
co-opt the indigenous and class based political struggle. One leader, Evo Morales, won 62% of 
the vote in the Chapare region establishing himself as a promising young star for the future of 
Bolivian politics. Morales appeared to be the charismatic leader the IU-ASP needed but soon 
after his electoral win in the Chapare region, Morales broke from the group because of a political 
disputes between CSUTCB that formed the ASP. Morales wanted to stay loyal to the Cocalero 
Union but also wanted to use the same strategies of the ASP. Morales created his own party 
borrowing the tactics of the IU-ASP union and the name MAS from a smaller, more obscure 
party.79 Morales’ break from the IU-ASP allowed him to focus more on the newfound 
indigenous identification of the country’s population and the coca farming industry without 
                                                          
78 McKee, C. The Campaign for an Instrumento Político: The Latest Developments in the Indigenous Movement in 
Bolivia. Unpublished paper presented at the Society for Latin American Studies Postgraduates in Latin American 
Studies, Hull, England, 4-5 December 
79  Albro R. 2006. The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia’s Indigenous Movements. Critique of Anthropology. 
26(4):387–410440  
 VonZabern 52 
 
dealing with the conflicting personalities in the IU-ASP. The majority of Bolivia’s population 
has indigenous roots but many did not formerly identify as indigenous. By 1999, Evo Morales 
and the MAS party solidified its place in the national political arena as a result of social 
movement politics. MAS organized blockades and marches which were consistently 
implemented to great effect during the Water Wars of 2001 and in other national protests.80  
 Evo Morales often would say ‘The MAS represents social movements, and is a political 
instrument of liberation. It is not the creation of politólogos, nor of political analysts, academics 
or politicians. It is born from a congress of peasants.’81 The spirit of social protest emerged 
during the Water War of 2000 and the Gas war of 2003. In 1999, President Hugo Banzer granted 
Cochabama’s water utilities to a U.S. based company called Bechtel after pressure from 
international lenders to privatize more of Bolivia’s industry. Water prices increased up to 200% 
leading to social resistance from the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life. The group 
protested with marches, strikes and roadblocks trying to create as much social upheaval as 
possible so they could have reasonable access to water. President Banzer Ordered 1,200 military 
personnel to regain control of the city where hundreds were injured and one was killed. As a 
response 100,000 citizens, including factory workers, farmers, Cocaleros, peasants, unionists, 
miners, students, and others converged on the city’s central plaza where the government realized 
it had to change the policy it had regarding the privatization of water.82  
 In September and October of 2003, protests in the suburb of El Alto resisted a pipeline 
exporting natural gas to Chile. In October government forces under Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 
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killed over 60 protesters causing a large scale movement in which 1000 people conducted a 
series of hunger strikes in solidarity with indigenous protesters. Similar to the intervention over 
Coca production by the U.S. and the privatization of water utilities due to the international 
lenders, the pipeline was seen as the last straw for much of the country’s population. Sanchez de 
Lozada resigned in March leaving the country in the hands of the vice president Carlos Mesa. 
Although protests over the pipeline was critical for creating structural political change, natural 
gas maintained a critical part in the economy.  
Once Morales and MAS won the presidency in 2005, they were given the opportunity to 
implement the ‘multiethnic and pluri-cultural’ democracy that he advocated for as the MAS grew 
in prominence. In 2009, Morales’ constitution passed through congress Indigenous peoples are to 
be recognized politically as opposed to assimilated into the traditional nation-state model. 
Several political parties including MAS meet to have an organized reaction to the public killings 
and determined that the roadblocks and nationwide strikes would continue indefinitely.83 The 
protest were enough to oust President Sanchez de Lozada from power ushering a demand for 
structural reform. The increasing and sustained protest is responsible for creating a new 
governmental structure that is particularly responsive to social protests.84 After two more years 
of social protests, Carlos Mesa, Lozada’s vice president and successor, also resigned creating the 
need for elections in 2005.  
Although Morales’ presidential win in 2005 marks a significant turning point for the 
MAS party and Bolivian politics toward a government more aligned with social movements, it 
was not the first step MAS took toward institutionalization. In 2002 after a close electoral loss, 
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Morales began to advocate for some reform policies from within the formal political system. For 
example Morales took a conciliatory position to the administration of Carlos Mesa, and 
supported many of Mesa’s moderate proposals.85 Morales distanced himself from his various 
leadership positions in various revolutionary movements and ceded his power to his former rival, 
Felipe Quispe so he could channel social movement energy into traditional political 
mobilization.  As Morales planned for the 2005 presidential election, he began to focus his 
attention on acquiescing support from the Bolivian middle class because he knew that he had 
already solidified the indigenous voting base. In the 2005 election there was an 85% voter 
turnout, the highest up until that point, and Morales won 53.7% of the electorate.86  
Evo Morales undeniably moved toward some more moderate policies in order to secure 
his position and appease some opposition forces on the right but still quickly nationalized the 
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natural gas industry in 2006. By nationalizing natural gas, Morales increased the size and 
spending power of his government. Morales attempted to implement policies to stimulate 
economic growth through Keynesian style government spending on social programs, 
infrastructure projects, investment into domestic production, and multi-sectoral investment. 87 
This strategy effectively coincided with the rhetoric promoting Bolivian economic autonomy in 
the face of years of colonial and post-colonial exploitation from foreign powers. Spending on 
social programs addressing poverty, sanitation, education and pension spending increased 45% 
in real terms but decreased as a proportion of the GDP.88 Additionally, Bolivia under the Morales 
government began planning for price fluctuation in natural resources by increasing the national 
reserve. Increasing national reserves was not just good economic planning, it was absolutely 
essential Bolivia’s survival and, by extension, the survival of the MAS party. Venezuela’s 
descent into economic disaster and social turmoil provided a stark example of the results when 
an oil producing country mismanaged their finances.   
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Although the economic changes under Morales are significant, the most dramatic change 
Morales implemented was the 2009 constitutional reform which called for a “Pluri-national” 
state. The constitution specifies in Article 1  
“Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National 
Communitarian Law (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional 
Comunitario) that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, inter-cultural, 
decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on 
political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration 
process of the country.”89  
The idea of plurinationality in terms of cultural representation in Bolivia is not inherently 
inconsistent with the economic centralization pursued under the MAS regime. However, the idea 
of decentralization and autonomy based on separate ethnic nationalities is inconsistent with the 
funding model the central government in Bolivia relies on. Unlimited access to the country’s 
natural resources such as natural gas and mining requires a hierarchical system of governance as 
opposed to a decentralized system of regions all equally responsible for the well-being of the 
collective state. In other words, equal regional autonomy and resource extraction led by one actor 
of a non-consenting party are mutually exclusive ideas. A counter argument to this idea is that a 
plurinational state does not explicitly mean equal political control but rather more autonomy for 
particular territories than the traditional Westphalian state model. This interpretation proves false 
when in Article 2, which guaranteed the right to autonomy, self-government, their culture, 
recognition of their institutions, and consolidation of their territorial entities within the 
framework of the unity of the state.90 Later, in Article 302, the constitution goes on to specify 
that enterprises of industrialization, distribution and commercialization of Hydrocarbons in 
                                                          
Johnston J, Lefebvre S. Bolivia's Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs. CEPR. http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-
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municipal territory are under the exclusive authority of the municipalities in which those 
resources are found.91 
The next landmark piece of legislation that relates to the TIPNIS struggle is Ley 071 also 
known as the Law of the Rights Mother Earth was passed in December 2010. The simple 10 
article law was designed to promote environmentalism as a leading tenet under the Morales 
regime. The law seeks to reaffirm the rights of “Mother Earth” as an obligation of the 
Plurinational state of Bolivia. Chapter 3 of the law lists the right to life, diversity of life, water, 
clean air, equilibrium, restauration and to live free of contamination.92 These principles are again 
contradictory to the inevitable dangers associated with both mineral extraction and natural gas 
extraction. The creation of this law in addition to the environmental stipulations in the 2009 
constitution coinciding with increased reliance on extractive practices that degrade the 
environment are puzzling. This is particularly confusing when we consider Morales leading role 
in social movements prior to his tenure as president. In order to understand how Morales’ regime 
continues to justify his sponsorship of the TIPNIS road project, one must look at the arguments 
on both sides of the TIPNIS road project to see how Morales is rationalizing, or ignoring his 
previous stances.  
 The immediate reaction to news of the TIPNIS road project in 2010 was protests by the 
majority of groups within the territory. The critique of the project was not an overall rejection of 
development in the region or a rejection of hydrocarbons in a general sense, but instead groups 
mobilized on the basis that their constitutional indigenous rights for territorial autonomy were 
denied.93 Indigenous groups were upset that the state did not consult with them at all prior to 
                                                          
91 Ibid Johnston  
92 Ley 071, Derechos de la Madre Tierra, December 21, 2010., Bolivia 
93 Ibid. Ley 071 
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announcing and beginning the road. Evo Morales was setting the precedent that indigenous 
territorial autonomy was secondary to the federal government’s priorities just one year after the 
new constitution. There was no consultation with indigenous groups over where or how to carry 
out the road project. The main consideration of the Morales government was that they would 
adhere to the conditions specified by the Brazilian Development Bank and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) that began funding the project from its inception in 2008.94  
 In 2011, after Morales insisted that the project would be constructed despite protest, 1000 
TIPNIS residents marched for 65 days from their territory to La Paz. The marchers endured 
drastic changes in weather and altitude changes, as well as food and water shortages, road blocks 
and violent repression from the police over their 360 mile journey.95 After 70 protesters were 
wounded, the government faced widespread condemnation from within municipality 
governments. Civic strikes ensued and two government ministers resigned. This social unrest led 
to a few short term changes in which Morales apologized on behalf of the police and he signed a 
law banning construction of the TIPNIS highway and named the reserve an “untouchable” 
zone.96  
 The status of TIPNIS as untouchable led to a series of policies by the federal government 
that prohibited sustainable development activities such as ecotourism which was a main source 
of income for many of the residents within the park. A new coalition of communities consisting 
of groups from the southern TIPNIS region who are also connected the coca economy in 
Cochabamba began a counter march to La Paz demanding that the road be built. Morales 
responded to the new protests in February 2012 by creating a consultation process (consulta) to 
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deal with the conflict within the park. The goal of the consultation was to address the problem of 
having mandated the TIPNIS road project without consulting the communities to begin with, and 
having revoked the road project without consultation to the southern communities of TIPNIS. 
The consulta reported 80% of TIPNIS communities supported the project while three opposed 
and 11 communities declined to participate.97 These results have been challenged by the Catholic 
Church and human rights organizations, which argued that the government manipulated the 
communities involved by underrepresenting the environmental impact of the road and 
overstating the economic benefits for those communities. Both the Church and human rights 
groups sponsored an independent commission which found that 30 of 35 communities were in 
fact opposed to the project and that the government manipulated groups saying they would 
provide additional financial support to their communities if they supported the project.  
The TIPNIS communities opposing the project argue that there would be little to no 
economic impact for communities and only environmental degradation. The planned road was 
over 50 km from the majority of TIPNIS communities which meant that the communities 
themselves could not use the road without exerting serious effort. They still would face the 
environmental risk to waterways and local agriculture inherent to hydrocarbon exploration and 
extraction. Some communities argue the road should be more accommodating for their 
communities while others argue any development of the road is counter to the constitutional 
commitment to Vivir Bien model. That model is one in which a small local and self-sustained 
community development model can live independently of the larger state model. One leader 
                                                          
97 Ángel Guarachi, “En el TIPNIS 55 comunidades apoyan vía por el parque; el Gobierno anuncia construir una 
carretera ecológica,” La Razón (La Paz, Bolivia), December 7, 2012, available at la-razon.com. 
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pointed out that indigenous roots and personal commitment to indigenous autonomy are not 
necessarily always aligned.  
“The TIPNIS is the heart of everyone in Bolivia but for me it is my 
homeland and my world because it is the world where we live, 
where we enjoy, where we have fun, where we live together, where 
we suffer, where we are ill, where we can move freely, no? and 
where we live in harmony, between humans and nature, with the 
insects, fish, animals and amphibians,…. We live together in this 
area for this reason, it is my world, and means the future existence 
of my indigenous community.”98  
Despite internal conflict within the region, the untouchable status of the TIPNIS region 
remained in place in theoretical terms until August 2015 when Morales introduced a new law 
reinstituting the road project. Morales argued that the road is essential for improving education 
and health infrastructure to the region. In 2013, when Morales was running for a second term in 
office, he mentioned that the road would be on hold until extreme poverty was addressed in the 
region.99 Resistance to the new law inspired a new opposition which combined traditional allies 
such as the Catholic Church, environmental NGOs, human rights’ groups, as well as new allies 
such as the national trade union federation called the Bolivian Workers Central (COB). The COB 
had once supported the road but have since changed positions after conflict with the MAS party. 
The southern region of TIPNIS is still in support of the road since their economy is intrinsically 
connected to the Cocaleros of Cochabamba. Morales has reintroduced this project in preparation 
for elections in 2019 seeking to realign himself with the Cocalero farmers from Cochabamba and 
meat producers of the Beni region. These regions are growing in importance because of 
population increase and the ideology is beginning to be pro-development in those regions.  
                                                          
98 TIPNIS leader 1 interview 2013.  
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The institutionalization of indigenous groups in the case of Bolivia is analogous with the 
overarching question that every indigenous community must face: How do we want to live? As 
the MAS has developed from a social movement party to the hegemonic political party in 
Bolivian politics, it has confirmed its commitment to both a Westphalia state model and an 
integrated socialist economy of the modern world. The debate surround the TIPNIS road project 
presents an interesting contraction in the MAS party’s dual commitment to the indigenous 
autonomy and to its socialist state model. The institutionalization of MAS as the indigenous 
social movement party to the subject of widespread indigenous protest exposes the ideological 
tension within the party. Still, having widespread commitment to indigenous autonomy has given 
protesters a legal framework in which they can argue their claims. The Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth and the 2009 Constitution have provided a framework that the majority of the 
communities in TIPNIS needed to argue their case. The most effective mobilizations in Bolivia 
on behalf of environmentalism have been organized, sustained and evoked a sense of indigenous 
identity in conjunction with conservation. Although the institutionalization of MAS as an 
indigenous movement accentuates ideological conflicts between socialism and pluri-nationalism, 
it still presents one of the most successful environmental cases in the three countries discussed.  
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Summary Table 
 La Oroya, Peru Oriente Region, 
Ecuador 
TIPNIS, Bolivia 
Presence of Indigenous 
Identity 
Yes Yes Yes 
National Indigenous 
Movement 
No Yes Yes 
Indigenous Party 
Formation 
No Yes Yes 
Indigenous Inspired 
Environmental Policy 
No Yes Yes 
Enforcement of Policy No No Temporary  
 
Analysis and Conclusions 
Indigenous social movements in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have undergone several waves of 
political importance throughout the twentieth century until today. After the surge of 
neoliberalism in Latin America had subsided by the early 2000s, coalitions between traditional 
leftist parties and indigenous groups seized their opportunities to gain control of their respective 
governments. With Toledo’s short lived green liberalism in Peru, Correa in Ecuador and Morales 
in Bolivia, each of these saw a major shift in the importance of their indigenous electorates. Each 
of the three countries has a high indigenous population, but also a dominant extractive industry 
that has serious consequences for the environment and public health of indigenous peoples. 
These three countries have long histories of social movements and street level political activism 
that have been fundamental to how democracy in these countries now function. These three 
countries have populations that articulate their indigenous identity to mobilize in drastically 
different ways. Why then, are there still mostly negative results for environmental outcomes 
when indigenous organizations have reached high levels of electoral and institutional success in 
coalition governments with the left in Bolivia and Ecuador? The case of Peru is fairly straight 
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forward because indigenous groups simply did not organize at a national level. To be clear, 
parties on the left are the logical choice for indigenous groups to align with given the shared 
historical marginalization and their shared critique of conservative governments. National 
organization of indigenous groups is critical for effectively mobilizing and advocating for 
environmental policy but once indigenous groups align with parties on the left that rely on 
extractive practices to fund social programs, environmental outcomes become less certain.  
The cases selected were the most likely to succeed at reaching a policy protecting a particular 
area and the enforcement of that law. The cases were highly politicized due to extreme 
environmental degradation causing community wide public health problems and by an important 
indigenous groups. All three cases actually had one or more laws protecting environment but 
faced varying challenges with enforcement. In La Oroya, the law requiring higher environmental 
standards in terms of air and water pollution came about as a result of conditionality from a 
World Bank loan and was not enforced until 2007. Ecuador passed its landmark environmental 
protection law in 1999 by using traditional protests techniques organized by CONAIE.  
The case of TIPNIS came after Bolivia saw constitutional reform and the law of the rights of 
mother earth that called for better environmental standards and gave indigenous groups the right 
to territorial autonomy. This made TIPNIS one of the most contentious environmental fights in 
Latin America in recent history. All of these cases have attracted the attention of international 
institutions, international NGOs, and widespread domestic support making it more likely these 
cases will result in success. Evaluating the variation in three most likely cases to succeed is 
crucial because the majority of political and legal battles over the environment in this region 
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have negative results. The most detectable variations are detectable in the most likely cases of 
success because most other cases have little to no effect at all.  
Another important criteria for case selection was that indigenous identification is similar in 
all three cases but indigenous organization varies. The appeal to indigenous identity nationally is 
obvious in all three of these countries. Alejandro Toledo used his identity as indigenous to win 
the presidency despite doing nothing for indigenous groups. Toledo’s could appeal to descriptive 
representation without having to be accountable to a national indigenous institution that could 
influence a large electorate so it is no surprise that there were no substantive environmental 
changes during his presidency. Ecuador had the CONAIE and later the Pachakutik advocating on 
behalf indigenous interests at the national level but these groups were divided on policy and 
spread too thin to effectively move policy in the Correa government. CONAIE and Pachakutik 
proved to motivate policy and advocate on behalf of the environment before the Correa’s 
progressive government came to power. When Correa was in power, the Pachakutik did not have 
as much sway in his national political agenda because the indigenous movement fragmented. 
Finally, the MAS party intertwined socialism and indigenous politics so tightly that Morales was 
guaranteed to break the laws that he had implemented. Morales designed the new 2009 
constitution and the Law for the Rights of Mother Earth that both independently established that 
indigenous communities would have autonomy over their land and that government would 
prioritize the environmental. The MAS began as a unified indigenous movement but later 
opposition to the TIPNIS road project showed that MAS could not represent all indigenous 
people. This is in stark contrast to the ad hoc campesinos protest in Peru, and the fragmented 
indigenous groups in Ecuador.  
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In order for indigenous voices to be heard in a larger democratic society, groups must band 
together in one unified bloc. The paradoxical relationship between plurinationality and unified 
representation provides a continuous tension for indigenous politics. This paradox is apparent in 
both Ecuador and Bolivia where national coalitions of indigenous groups and struggled to come 
to a consensus on environmental policy. Cultural variation between indigenous groups and 
regional preferences are the main ways in which indigenous groups vary. In all three countries 
there is a sharp cultural contrast between Andean indigenous people who descend from Quechua, 
Aymara or Kichwa and those who descend from the amazon where there are hundreds of distinct 
groups with their own cultural practices. Both Ecuador and Bolivia formed indigenous groups 
based on regional interests in addition to national interests. In Ecuador, regional interest took 
precedence over national politics and support for Pachakutik quickly diminished. In Bolivia, 
splits within the north and south of TIPNIS over what to do with the road finally revealed the 
ways in which regional loyalties play out. Southern groups with ties to Cocalero farmers tended 
to favor the road because they believe there is more likely to be economic growth in their region, 
whereas groups in the north are likely to see environmental degradation from the extraction of 
hydrocarbons. In La Oroya, mobilization was not centered around the constructed connection of 
indigeneity and conservation, but instead around the effects of policy. People would mobilize 
because their children are sick, or because they are afraid of losing their job at the smelter instead 
of out of collective indigenous comradery. In all of these cases, traditional political means were 
not initially sufficient and people decided to mobilize through protest.  
Indigenous social movements have traditionally affiliated with the left, because the left is 
uncomfortable with the extant at which inequity persists generally in society. Indigenous groups 
in Latin America have been at the lowest part of the historical social hierarchy. There are 
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generation of indigenous people who have felt left out and denied autonomy from colonization 
until the present day. In the past few decades in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso had done lasting 
damage to the left when they assassinated several leaders that might pose as an alternative. This 
brutality from the Sendero Luminoso also made much of the more moderate Peruvian population 
skeptical of political parties on the left. In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous groups have aligned 
with varying levels of support for the left. In Ecuador, Luis Macas, denied joining Correa’s 
presidential ticket as vice president but ended up endorsing Correa after the Pachakutik lost in 
the first round. In Bolivia, the MAS party is hegemonic in its control over most indigenous 
voters, Cocalero constituents, and the urban working class. This unchallenged control has led 
Morales and the MAS party to achieve relatively radical and sometimes contradictory policy 
goals.  
 The alignment between indigenous groups and the left comes largely in contrast to 
neoliberal policies imposed by conservatives and the Washington Consensus. In Peru, the 
reaction to the Fujimori government led to Alejandro Toledo who was further left than Fujimori 
and Alan Garcia. This, however, was not an enduring change and right wing politics remains 
largely more organized and consistent then the left in Peru. Correa’s electoral win in Ecuador 
marked a serious win for the left that ushered in a series of progressive reforms that have 
improved the livelihood of many Ecuadorians. This progressive base is in spite of Pachakutik 
that has seen very little electoral success. As previously mentioned the Bolivian left has strongly 
aligned with indigenous groups and have been explicit in their contempt for Neoliberalism. This 
is because of the severe shock therapy tactics implemented in the 1980s as well as the War on 
Drugs that targeted Coca producers in Bolivia. Another key aspect that both the left and 
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indigenous groups want is a more equitable land distribution often sought after through Agrarian 
reform.  
 The common interests of making coalitions between indigenous groups and the left are a 
particularly potent combination when mobilized through social movements. Both CONAIE and 
MAS were extremely effective when they advocated for policies using disruptive political 
strategies before institutionalization. Social movements are extremely effective in preventing 
policy outcomes like building a pipeline, or a stopping the privatization of water, but it is much 
more difficult to get a large group of people to agree on a policy solution. Internal divisions and 
policy preferences between indigenous groups become more apparent when social movements 
institutionalize because groups must form and solidify policy goals that effect their communities 
in different ways. This is largely consistent with Piven and Cloward’s theory that once 
movements institutionalize they become less effect than they were when they could use more 
radical forms of demonstration. The tension within groups became most apparently in the case of 
MAS and Bolivia. Social movements in Bolivia organized thousands of people into cities during 
its protests, but once Morales had to decide between creating a source of potential revenue to 
fund social programs and respecting indigenous autonomy and maintaining preference for 
environment conservation. He first prioritized building extractive infrastructure until he saw too 
much opposition via social movement. Later, Morales began implementing the project again 
when it became more politically feasible. These disagreements do not come up when groups are 
simply mobilizing to stop some policy and are not actually in a position of power. 
The role of institutionalization has produced somewhat mixed results for Ecuador and 
Bolivia. When Ecuador’s indigenous movement created Pachakutik, it lost power because the 
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split from CONAIE accentuated tactical disagreements about what is the best for the countries 
wildly diverse indigenous population. Bolivia’s institutionalization was largely successful in 
terms of creating real policy changes but the enforcement of those policies put other priorities of 
the MAS party at risk. Still, the TIPNIS road was halted on the basis of constitutional statues 
created by the MAS party. Creating those laws is undeniably progress although it falls short of a 
catch all solution to maintaining indigenous autonomy and protection of the environment.  
The conflicting interests between indigenous and groups on the left reflects fundamental 
questions about the ways that democracy should function when the needs and desires of 
particular groups of people vary so profoundly. Indigenous groups must advocate collectively to 
have power but, in doing so, groups sacrifice particular aspects of their more specific regional 
goals. These problems are inherent to any political organization but the tradeoffs are particularly 
sharp because of the radically different ways in which indigenous groups live. Do indigenous 
groups have the responsibility to sacrifice sections of their territory for the well-being of people 
who live in different regions of the country? Do indigenous people have an obligation to the 
traditions of their particular group? How do indigenous groups want to interact with modernity 
politically and culturally? These questions are fundamental in the ways in which communities 
organize and represent themselves in the modern world. In addition to questions of related to 
ethnic representation, it is also important to consider the ways in which environmental 
movements manifest, and mobilize for their causes, especially when the consequences of 
particular projects are confined to groups with substantially less political power than those 
benefiting from extractive projects.  
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